Iraq

Reporting from Iraq:Or visit: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g-H4Rj6k-WU&feature=channel_page

Here is the latest report from Doug Grindle: For technicians clearing landmines left over from previous wars, there is a thing called a 'toolbox' approach to getting rid of the old buried weapons. Read more

WCCA member, friend and supporter, and now freelance journalist, sends us the latest from Iraq:

End State Iraq

Doug Grindle, February 27, 2009

Baqqubah, Diyala Province, Iraq - With President Barack Obama's announcement that the bulk of US forces will withdraw by September 2010, the American end-state in Iraq is settled.

Or is it? And what does it all mean for the Iraqis?

Still in flux are details that may derail the plan, or reinforce it. Ultimately the end state in Iraq will be less a matter of numbers on the ground. It will be a state of mind about the security. A concept, if you will, a feeling on the ground. Obama's numbers suggest what the mind-set will be, but in Iraq nothing is ever settled until it is settled.

In flux or unproven:

- As Obama declared the September 2010 deadline, and said 35,000 - 50,000 US troops would remain longer, Republican Rep. John McHugh of the House Armed Services Commitee declared he had been assured by Obama that "there is a Plan B" to keep troops levels higher than this plan, for longer, if security in Iraq goes badly wrong. Whether this is in practice a realistic assurance is hard to say.

- Iraqi President Nuri al Maliki has presumably been brought on board. This comes after Maliki publicly declared during most of 2008 that no US troops were wanted beyond 2010. As widely believed in Iraq, this was political posturing to prove he is a powerful figure, aimed at a domestic audience, while his private discussions abroad were very different.

- Armed groups such as Al Qaeda in Iraq, the 'Mahdi Army' militia of Muqtada al Sadr have not yet given up the ghost. A handful of US servicemen die in Iraq every month to bombs and gunfire. Thee groups are trying to come back after severe disruptions, though few believe they have the power right now to do so.

- There is a popular theory in Iraq that goes like this - when the US pulls out, four major sides will begin dueling to the death. The sides are: The Sunnis (the pro-government Sons of Iraq armed group is the backbone of this Sunni military base); Muqtada al Sadr's Mahdi Army (which is Shia); the Iraqi Army and government (which is mostly Shia); and lastly the Kurds (the Peshmerga is the military arm of the Kurds). This theory says that the strongest militias with the most guns will take over in a bloodbath. A major continuing US presence would stop this from happening, so the theory goes. Would 35-50,000 troops be enough to deter the violence? (Most probably 'Yes').

- A popular theory on the American East Coast right now is that Iran has in effect taken over the country anyway. By supporting every Shia political party, including Maliki's, and supporting the Sunni insurgents and al Qaeda, Iran has won more friends and influence than it knows that to do with. Nothing happens in Iraq without Iran's say-so, says this theory, especially oil contracts in the south of Iraq and recconstruction contracts of all kinds in the center. Even here in Diyala. Is this true? Has America lost anyway? Can a country like Iran, which killed half a million Iraqis in the 1980s, just walk in and take over by proxy, essentially Finlandizing the country or worse? No one really knows.

In fact, what Iraq needs now is economic development. The electricity grid, oil production, and the switch from a state-system to a true capitalist system all need time to develop. Iraqis need peace. Right now Iraqis are mostly getting peace. Al Qaeda is in hiding, even as the US military moves against it in eastern Diyala and Mosul, trying to clean the cells out.

But what Iraqis really want is security. They have sorely missed the feeling that they can go out at night without fear.

Things are much better. The big car bombs of the past that plagued many Iraqi cities, in Diyala, Mosul and Baghdad, are more or less gone now. The sectarian violence is over. But security as a state of mind is not yet here. An Iraqi police lieutenant based in Baqqubah city, in Diyala, told this reporter this week that he cannot venture out of his house at night because it is too dangerous. He is safe in his house, but not outside.

Baqqubah until recently had few security incidents per week. It is on the surface calm. But is the state of mind arrived yet? That is the true end state of the war, because it’s the end state that businessmen require to invest money and create jobs here. So the withdrawal is not the real test of Iraq's future. For Iraq, it's how the people feel once America has drawn down the troops. And that good feeling could take a bit longer than September 2010.

We recieved this latest News Note from Doug Grindle, a member of WCCA and former community producer now freelance reporter.

It's spring in Iraq.. in a seasonal sense anyway

Al Asad, Anbar Province, western Iraq - Like a rash that refuses to fade, violence persists in Iraq. Mosul in the north, Baghdad and areas north of Baghdad see daily attacks, though most attacks are aimed at the Iraqi security forces.
The toll of American combat deaths, which was once a flood reaching 125 a month, is now a drip of less than half a dozen a month. Officers say driving accidents are more likely to kill troops than the enemy. In northern Iraq and here in western Iraq, where it is quietest, hundreds if not thousands of US troops wonder why they are here and complain they have too little to do. The biggest complaint here at Al Asad, a large Marine base near Syria, is that the Marines spend too much time in the gym because their patrols are fewer than they once were. It is no big secret that the Marine top brass has been trying to exit Anbar entirely and shift their forces to Afghanistan for over a year.
Still fighting in Iraq are remnants of Al Qaeda, remnants of the Shia militias, remnants of Sunni Islamists and Sunni nationalists. Add in localized tribal fights. Add in local retribution against the Iraqi government or the US military for the occasional missteps, such as accidental shootings of Iraqi civilians. Add in the organized criminal elements, many of whom were spawned by the legitimate political insurgents. The violence in Iraq has fragmented, which is both good and bad.
It's bad because no one group laying down its arms will quell a whole mass of fighting. The Sunnis gave up in November 2006 and the effects were enormously far-reaching. But that won't likely happen again on such a massive scale.
Then again it's also good, because as anyone who has watched tag-team wrestling on television will know, opponents operating piecemeal are much easier to cut up than those who fight as a unified team.
So the question remains, just why does America still have 130,000 plus troops in Iraq if many of them are wondering what they are going to do today, tomorrow and the next day to justify their (generally tax free) pay checks?
They are here because America is Iraq’s insurance policy.
If the Shia militias reorganize, as analysts in Baghdad say they are (unsuccessfully) trying to. If Al Qaeda manages to kick off sectarian violence again (as it is likely trying to do, with the recent killing of dozens of Shia pilgrims heading to Karbala). If Sunni nationalists feel the Maliki government has stuck it to them, and want to stick it back (as is the fear, with the government's avowed aim of dismantling the widespread pro-government Sunni counter-terrorism groups, named the Sons of Iraq).
If any of these things should happen, US forces are ready to step in and do what the Iraqi security forces may or may not be able to do for themselves.
General Petraeus reportedly has sent a plan calling for a 23-month withdrawal from Iraq to the White House. That’s longer than Barack Obama's repeated 16-month preference. Most likely the withdrawal will never be down to zero at all, despite tough talk by the Maliki government and the White House, and few people in Iraq I've spoke to expect the US military presence will ever reach zero.
Officers of the Iraqi security forces say they still need US support, moral as much as material, as they slowly improve. Above all, America provides the moral fiber that gives the ISF the psychological edge over their well-armed, determined, though now battered, opponents.
These are the forces at play in Iraq.
How soon America can draw down its troops without upsetting the delicate balance of these forces is the game that will be played out for the rest of 2009 in Iraq and Washington.

Take care
Doug

Doung Grindle Writes:
Oct 24, 2008
Hello All; I hope alls well.Well this is the last blog from
Afghanistan this trip.
Pech Valley, northeast Afghanistan - Afghanistan is a mountainous country, with
hills of the south giving way to mountains of the Hindu Kush in the northeast.
Here in this northeastern province named Kunar it is incredibly rough and rugged.
Only 13 percent of the countryside is arable, says its governor. The rest of the
province is steep mountainside - good for woodcutting and lousy for pretty much
everything else. (And even the wood is dwindling at an alarming rate)If this
country is mountainous, then the war in this country will be won or lost in the
mountains. So let's consider how that might happen. How do you win a war in the
mountains? Why in the valleys of course. Let's consider three different valleys.Example number one, Afghanya valley, where the war is not being won.In
Kapisa province northeast of Kabul lies the Afghanya valley, named after one of
the villages near its mouth. It is a wild side-valley off a main one (called the
Tagab), where the security forces now fear to tread. But this past spring, a
small force of 50 or so national guardsmen from Pennsylvania did tread the
Afghanya, which is 10 or so miles long and has a couple of tiny side valleys of
its own. These guardsmen literally walked it because, they say, walking valleys
is the best way to pacify them. You get to know the locals, they get to know you,
and it is coincidentally safer than driving Humvees, which are vulnerable to
roadside bombs.In Afghanya the guardsmen walked, and the insurgents fought back.
About 100 insurgents live in the valley, say the soldiers, and they had
reinforcements. Many of the firefights started when the guardsmen walked or drove up the valley, and were ambushed on the way back.Over the course of 4 months and about 40 firefights about a third of the guardsmen were wounded, several seriously. No one was killed. The insurgents suffered several hundred killed, from a combination of air power and ground fire.By the end, the guardsmen pushed the insurgents farther back into the valley, and started talking to the villagers about bringing in civil projects, such as wells and roads. It was a success... almost.Then the guardsmen moved out and were replaced by roughly 350 French soldiers. Bad news. The French soldiers are nice, personable people, but they stopped going into the Afghanya valley. They don't like to walk, and they seemed afraid of getting their thinly armored vehicles blown up by roadside bombs. With that number of soldiers, what the French should have done is build observation posts and push a permanent presence into the valley, say the guardsmen. But they didn't. Instead the French concentrate on patrolling the main road that runs through the province along the Tagab, rather than venturing into the dangerous side valleys like Afghanya that branch off that main road.Now the coalition has little influence in Afghanya valley. The insurgents have regrouped and no security forces ever goes more than 2 kilometers inside it.The guardsmen say it's a crying shame, but there isn't much they can do about it. They still operate nearby, protecting a group of soldiers that coordinate civil projects such as wells and schools. But they say security there is currently hopeless. The
situation galls them, so to speak.That is failure number one.Failure number
two:The Korengal valley, a few miles from this base here in the Pech valley,
Kunar Province, is a nightmare. The locals dislike any foreigners in this
side-valley. They tolerate the Taliban, however. There are US bases in the
Korengal, tiny bases, shared with Afghan soldiers and constantly under attack.
The other week three US soldiers were killed by a roadside bomb. The US is
trying. It wants to push a road into the Korengal, but that project has been on
hold for 90 days, say the soldiers. An ambitious plan to build a road through the
Korengal and connect it to another one farther south, bringing trade and
prosperity, is completely stalled. The villagers just don't want it.The official
plan calls for the road project to be finished in 18 months, but the reality will
be more like 7 years, says the local US commander. He says the Korengal isn't
important enough to get too fussed over, and is not the key to the region. Its
just a side valley, after all. But the Pech valley, the main valley in the area
from which the Korengal branches off, is very important.The Korengal then is
failure number two.But the third of our examples, the Pech valley, as I have
mentioned in a previous message, is a success-in-the-making.It received a paved
road about 2 years ago running its entire length. It runs on the north side of
the river that runs along the valley. A second road is now being built on the
south side of the river. Five US and Afghan bases run along its length. These
days the insurgents sit on the slopes of the surrounding hillsides and lob down
mortars and rockets onto the bases. But they rarely hit anything worthwhile,
though the noise is impressive. Soldiers seldom die in the Pech itself.The Pech
and the town at its mouth, Asadabad, is seeing a vigorous infusion of trade
because of the new road. The villages along the valley are generally quiet, and
more wells, roads, and water projects are going in. The Taliban is not stamped
out, but major progress is being made. The Pech then is a limited but growing
success, given that development only arrived about two years ago.War in the
valleys is tough. It requires manpower, both Afghan and American, to build bases
and establish security, and it requires money to bring development, roads, wells
and schools to villages. (The next step in the chain is stamping out the
corruption that the first wave of development inevitably brings with it.) It is
all time consuming and costly. It takes years to build roads. And in one province
alone, Kunar, the US can expect to spend $80 million on civil projects in a heavy
year (this year), and $50 million on an average year. Whenever bases, security,
and development all coincide, the locals do generally respond. But when these
things do not coincide, the war grinds on.This is true about 90 percent of the
time. Which is an acceptable average. As for the other 10 percent (like the
Korengal), you just have to move on.In a mountainous country the war is won or
lost in the valleys. America needs to hope that there are more winning valleys
like the Pech and fewer losing ones like Afghanya or the Korengal. Success takes time, money and troops. For 6 years, from 2001-2006, the right elements were too scarce here. That may now be changing. More US and Afghan troops will be needed, and plenty of cash too, to make it all work.

Doug Grindle, October 14, 2008 Pech Valley, northeast Afghanistan

This is a fairly wild region thats just now coming under better control - and slowly at that.

Afghanistan is Improving Slowly. As much as the news from Afghanistan tends to be bad these days, some bright spots are already faintly discernable on the horizon.As I have mentioned, things in Afghanistan are no piece of cake. Attacks are up about 30 percent this year.

For the first time the generals have said the situation in Pakistan will need to be solved before the war in Afghanistan can be won. And the war is getting deadlier. More than 130 US soldiers dead so far this year. Roadside bombs, used to such deadly effect in Iraq, are now well and truly part of the Afghan scene. The Afghan defense minister said the other day bomb makers, sophisticated enough to know how to blow apart coalition vehicles, are forsaking Iraq as a lost cause and flocking here instead.And the drug trade continues, often under the protection and sponsorship of the Taliban. Corruption is rife in the government and security forces.Whew! How bad can it get over here? It's pretty bad.And yet.. and yet.Some of those hopeful signs are starting to emerge, and they are going to get bigger as the time goes on.

Development is the keynote of the strategy to win here. Here in the Pech Valley, I am typing this on a small base by a river on the valley floor. The Pech used to be terrible from one end to the other. About 2 years ago the government (paid for by the US) ran a paved road along the bottom. Now the Pech Valley is pretty quiet on the bottom, and the insurgents spent most of their time in the hills above the valley, dropping in mortars and rockets on bases like this one. The moral: development works. Too bad it will take another year before roads go into the side valleys, where the same peace-making can be expected to take place. Some places will never be peaceful (the Korengal, a side valley of the Pech, is one example). But overall,
development works. - In the northeast the US military is now moving to arm the
local tribes to fight the insurgents. This is the same strategy that General David
Petraeus (now commander of US Central Command) used in Iraq to win the support of the Sunnis. Which won the war there. Essentially, you pay the tribes to act as
militiamen. For a wage they fight the insurgents. It is the earliest of days yet
to see if this will work here (about 2 weeks in). But we know unemployment causes
instability. 10 percent of the population is poor enough to want to fight for
their supper. This strategy ought to work here as it worked in Iraq.- Corruption
is plenty lousy. But the government is finally beginning to fire people who have
their hand in the till. Five provincial governors are 'reformist' governors whose
backgrounds are working for NGOs. They are the antithesis of warlords, who are
universally corrupt.

A body called the Independent Directorate for Local Governance has been set up to appoint provincial government officials, who are generally not corrupt. Still, all too often corrupt officials are let off. Or they are 'fired' and promoted. But there are Afghans out there who will resist bribery on a large scale. The earliest steps have been taken.- The economy is getting better, slowly. People are desperately poor still. Prices are rising. But the number of cars in Kabul has risen approximately four-fold since 2001. There is money in the markets of provincial capitals. As roads are built trade invariably increases. The process is just beginning- Afghanistan can expect a mini-surge of US troops. Some analysts, such as the British ambassador to Afghanistan, believe foreign troops are the problem not the solution. Not so. A surge of troops into the northeast, which can insulate Pakistan’s restive tribal area across the border, will bring much of the stability needed to build more roads! This is a
good thing, even though many other provinces will not be covered. And even though
the money for roads too limited, even here near Pakistan.

The Afghan National Army (ANA) is supposed to double to about 125,000 men within 5 years. At last. The ANA is good, and this should have happened years ago.- The Pakistanis are arming their own tribal militias across the border. It could well be possible to foster a split within the Taliban, which is becoming a criminal conspiracy at heart, if the right pressure is exerted long enough.So in all, the news from Afghanistan is grim. It is terrible. But for the first time in months, it looks like the news from Afghanistan could be much improved by the middle of next year.

WCCA member, long time supporter and friend Doug Grindle sends us his latest "News Note" .

Hello All:
I hope alls well.
Sorry - this is only a week after the last NewsNote!
Oh well never mind.
The roadside bomb situation is getting worse here, getting to be more like Iraq used
to be.
The more things change...
If this is all too much just send an unsubscribe
all the best
Doug

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Khost, Afghanistan - With the US Army's strategy in Afghanistan, victory at best is
going to be a long time coming. At worst it isn’t going to come at all.
The US strategy is based on a broad-based plan that assumes the insurgency
cannot be stopped by killing terrorists alone. Instead of killing the
insurgents, the villages which harbor the insurgents must be brought over to the
side of the government.
As I've mentioned before, this strategy is the Marie Antoinette 'let them eat
cake' philosophy turned on its head - if the peasants are starving and unhappy,
provide them wells, electricity, schools and a government that cares and they
will decide to support the government. Add in security, whereby the locals have
a reasonable chance of surviving if they resist the insurgents, because the
Afghan army and police patrol the villages consistently, and victory will come.
This strategy of course takes literally years to implement. It takes two to
four years to build the main roads, years more to build the infrastructure
inside the villages at the ends of the roads. But it should work.
This is of course the rosy scenario (though it is reasonably likely to work).
But there are some flies in the ointment that could wreck the plan. And there
isn't much time left to experiment because after seven years of war, time here
is running out.
The flies are:
* Tribal rivalries and divisions. Many tribes hate each other and uniting them
is difficult. More importantly, tribes stick together. Getting each village to
sign on with the government often requires the entire tribe to sign on. But
building a well in one village won’t persuade a whole tribe to back the government.
Especially when half the tribe lives across the border in Pakistan and those members
are paid regularly by insurgents to kill Americans. Hydro projects on this side of
the border don’t influence anyone across the border in Pakistan. And there had be
plenty of those projects on this side of the border.
* Corruption is eating the system. Corruption isn’t just petty thievery and
graft. It isn’t just pilfering fuel supplies meant for army and police vehicles.
It isn't even giving your incompetent cousin the army commander’s job that should
have gone to someone who actually is able to do the job properly. Corruption is a
breakdown in the rule of law. It means rapists of children are not brought to
justice. Murderers and terrorists get out of jail for a bribe. Families are
dishonored and the government is seen as the problem, not the solution.
Americans describe corruption as an Afghan problem which the Afghans must solve
themselves. Phooey. America pays for and props up the government. Exerting
leverage to demand mass firings of incompetent army officers, government
officials who steal from their constituents, and jailers and judges and police
who refuse to arrest criminals or let them out of prison, is badly needed.
America has the leverage to impose it. In time the country will grow out of
corruption, as the economy revs up and as bad people are slowly eased out. But
for now some government sectors - namely the army and the criminal justice
system - should be held to a high enough standard that firings for corruption
are commonplace and not the exception. These sectors should not be a mockery of
what the government is supposed to stand for, because that alienates the very
people now sitting on the fence. It wouldn't matter if America had a different
strategy, but it does matter when the US strategy hinges on popular good will
toward the government.
* The last fly is unfortunately the US effort itself. Many US military officers
and civilian officials make too many excuses for basic failings.
Problem - USAID and State Department are not pulling their weight. How can the
Afghan government be stood up with a handful of civil advisors in each province?
It cannot. The excuse - no one wants to serve in the provinces which are
'unsafe'.
Problem - the police training is years behind where it shoudl be because police
training was not taken seriously until 2006. The excuse - the international
community failed its mission in previous years.
Problem - there are too few US soldiers and US Marines training Afghan police
and army units, and it's going to get worse as the security forces expand. (For
instance, most Afghan Army battalions have half the US advisors the US Army plan
says they need.) Problem - major infrastructure projects take literally years
longer than they should. (For instance, the Khost-Gardez road, repaving 62
kilometers, will take 5 years to complete. But the roadwork itself is expected
to only take about 7 months). Problem - there are too few helicopters.
Problem - the US intelligence services (civil and military) are providing
rudimentary service to the war effort at best, in the prime task of finding and
killing insurgent plotters throughout Afghanistan.
The excuses are generally that Afghanistan is a sideshow compared to Iraq and we
are doing the best we can with limited resources. But that is an excuse, not a
reason for such widespread problems.
Almost two years ago General Petraeus altered the way of doing things in Iraq,
with smaller bases, more troops and better coordination with locals (especially
Sunnis). The result was a win (a fragile win but a win nonetheless). In
Afghanistan, more forthright talking, more creative solutions and less excuses
are needed.
Otherwise it’s going to be a long war, and possibly one without end. The
American people are patient, but a 20-year-war here is untenable, and you can
bet al Qaeda and the Taliban know it too.

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