military

WCCA member, long time supporter and friend Doug Grindle sends us his latest "News Note" .

Hello All:
I hope alls well.
Sorry - this is only a week after the last NewsNote!
Oh well never mind.
The roadside bomb situation is getting worse here, getting to be more like Iraq used
to be.
The more things change...
If this is all too much just send an unsubscribe
all the best
Doug

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Khost, Afghanistan - With the US Army's strategy in Afghanistan, victory at best is
going to be a long time coming. At worst it isn’t going to come at all.
The US strategy is based on a broad-based plan that assumes the insurgency
cannot be stopped by killing terrorists alone. Instead of killing the
insurgents, the villages which harbor the insurgents must be brought over to the
side of the government.
As I've mentioned before, this strategy is the Marie Antoinette 'let them eat
cake' philosophy turned on its head - if the peasants are starving and unhappy,
provide them wells, electricity, schools and a government that cares and they
will decide to support the government. Add in security, whereby the locals have
a reasonable chance of surviving if they resist the insurgents, because the
Afghan army and police patrol the villages consistently, and victory will come.
This strategy of course takes literally years to implement. It takes two to
four years to build the main roads, years more to build the infrastructure
inside the villages at the ends of the roads. But it should work.
This is of course the rosy scenario (though it is reasonably likely to work).
But there are some flies in the ointment that could wreck the plan. And there
isn't much time left to experiment because after seven years of war, time here
is running out.
The flies are:
* Tribal rivalries and divisions. Many tribes hate each other and uniting them
is difficult. More importantly, tribes stick together. Getting each village to
sign on with the government often requires the entire tribe to sign on. But
building a well in one village won’t persuade a whole tribe to back the government.
Especially when half the tribe lives across the border in Pakistan and those members
are paid regularly by insurgents to kill Americans. Hydro projects on this side of
the border don’t influence anyone across the border in Pakistan. And there had be
plenty of those projects on this side of the border.
* Corruption is eating the system. Corruption isn’t just petty thievery and
graft. It isn’t just pilfering fuel supplies meant for army and police vehicles.
It isn't even giving your incompetent cousin the army commander’s job that should
have gone to someone who actually is able to do the job properly. Corruption is a
breakdown in the rule of law. It means rapists of children are not brought to
justice. Murderers and terrorists get out of jail for a bribe. Families are
dishonored and the government is seen as the problem, not the solution.
Americans describe corruption as an Afghan problem which the Afghans must solve
themselves. Phooey. America pays for and props up the government. Exerting
leverage to demand mass firings of incompetent army officers, government
officials who steal from their constituents, and jailers and judges and police
who refuse to arrest criminals or let them out of prison, is badly needed.
America has the leverage to impose it. In time the country will grow out of
corruption, as the economy revs up and as bad people are slowly eased out. But
for now some government sectors - namely the army and the criminal justice
system - should be held to a high enough standard that firings for corruption
are commonplace and not the exception. These sectors should not be a mockery of
what the government is supposed to stand for, because that alienates the very
people now sitting on the fence. It wouldn't matter if America had a different
strategy, but it does matter when the US strategy hinges on popular good will
toward the government.
* The last fly is unfortunately the US effort itself. Many US military officers
and civilian officials make too many excuses for basic failings.
Problem - USAID and State Department are not pulling their weight. How can the
Afghan government be stood up with a handful of civil advisors in each province?
It cannot. The excuse - no one wants to serve in the provinces which are
'unsafe'.
Problem - the police training is years behind where it shoudl be because police
training was not taken seriously until 2006. The excuse - the international
community failed its mission in previous years.
Problem - there are too few US soldiers and US Marines training Afghan police
and army units, and it's going to get worse as the security forces expand. (For
instance, most Afghan Army battalions have half the US advisors the US Army plan
says they need.) Problem - major infrastructure projects take literally years
longer than they should. (For instance, the Khost-Gardez road, repaving 62
kilometers, will take 5 years to complete. But the roadwork itself is expected
to only take about 7 months). Problem - there are too few helicopters.
Problem - the US intelligence services (civil and military) are providing
rudimentary service to the war effort at best, in the prime task of finding and
killing insurgent plotters throughout Afghanistan.
The excuses are generally that Afghanistan is a sideshow compared to Iraq and we
are doing the best we can with limited resources. But that is an excuse, not a
reason for such widespread problems.
Almost two years ago General Petraeus altered the way of doing things in Iraq,
with smaller bases, more troops and better coordination with locals (especially
Sunnis). The result was a win (a fragile win but a win nonetheless). In
Afghanistan, more forthright talking, more creative solutions and less excuses
are needed.
Otherwise it’s going to be a long war, and possibly one without end. The
American people are patient, but a 20-year-war here is untenable, and you can
bet al Qaeda and the Taliban know it too.

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Here's the link

Related:
This week on WCCA's "Flipside" Lynne Simonds gave a stunning interview with a military reporter discussing the inhuman brutality and psychological hardship military personnel (soldiers) including military reporters have to deal with in action and upon returning home. You do not want to miss part two of that program.

Peace